Can a reductionist be a pluralist?

Biology and Philosophy 19 (1):55-73 (2004)
Pluralism is often put forth as a counter-position to reductionism. In this essay, I argue that reductionism and pluralism are in fact consistent. I propose that there are several potential goals for reductions and that the proper form of a reduction should be considered in tandem with the goal that it aims to achieve. This insight provides a basis for clarifying what version(s) of reductionism are currently defended, for explicating the notion of a fundamental level of explanation, and for showing how one can be both a reductionist and a pluralist.
Keywords HIV  Molecular Biology  Multiple-Realizability  Pluralism  Reduction  Reductionism  Unification
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DOI 10.1023/B:BIPH.0000013263.35121.5a
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Stéphanie Ruphy (2005). Why Metaphysical Abstinence Should Prevail in the Debate on Reductionism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 19 (2):105 – 121.

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