Graduate studies at Western
Inquiry 14 (1-4):445-463 (1971)
|Abstract||Carl G. Hempel has expressed the view that explanation in history is of a kind with explanation in any other branch of empirical science. Historians, according to him, aim at showing that the events they describe are not matters of chance. In the author's opinion there is no necessary connection between these two statements. Historians often aim at showing that the events they describe are matters of chance. But this does not make explanation in history different from explanation in other branches of empirical science|
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