David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (1):219-231 (2006)
Woodward present an argument for the Causal Markov Condition (CMC) on the basis of a principle they dub ‘modularity’ ([1999, 2004]). I show that the conclusion of their argument is not in fact the CMC but a substantially weaker proposition. In addition, I show that their argument is invalid and trace this invalidity to two features of modularity, namely, that it is stated in terms of pairwise independence and ‘arrow-breaking’ interventions. Hausman & Woodward's argument can be rendered valid through a reformulation of modularity, but it is doubtful that the argument so revised provides any substantially new insight regarding the basis of the CMC. Introduction The CMC versus Hausman & Woodward's conclusion Hausman & Woodward's argument Modularity and independent error terms Conclusion Appendix: D-separation.
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Citations of this work BETA
Peter Spirtes (2011). Intervention, Determinism, and the Causal Minimality Condition. Synthese 182 (3):335-347.
Bert Leuridan (2012). Three Problems for the Mutual Manipulability Account of Constitutive Relevance in Mechanisms. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (2):399-427.
Brendan Clarke, Bert Leuridan & Jon Williamson (2013). Modelling Mechanisms with Causal Cycles. Synthese:1-31.
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