David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Metaphysica 11 (2):211-222 (2010)
This paper provides an outline of a theory of causal truthmaking according to which contingent truths are made true by causal facts and dispositional mechanisms. These facts and mechanisms serve to account for the truth of propositions by explaining in a non-epistemic fashion why they have come about as truths. Given that negative causation is allowed for, we are able to provide truthmakers for negative truths without making appeal to negative facts, lacks or absences. The paper takes its starting point in the following claims by George Molnar: the world is everything that exists; everything that exists is positive; some negative claims about the world are true; and every true claim about the world is made true by something that exists. The conclusion is reached that we can keep in a consistent manner if causal truthmaking is permitted
|Keywords||Truthmaking Causation Probability Explanation Negative truth|
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References found in this work BETA
D. M. Armstrong (2004). Truth and Truthmakers. Cambridge University Press.
David K. Lewis (1973). Counterfactuals. Blackwell Publishers.
Alexander Bird (2007). Nature's Metaphysics: Laws and Properties. Oxford University Press.
D. M. Armstrong (1997). A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge University Press.
D. M. Armstrong (1993). A World of States of Affairs. Philosophical Perspectives 7 (3):429-440.
Citations of this work BETA
Timothy Perrine (2015). Undermining Truthmaker Theory. Synthese 192 (1):185-200.
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