Dispositions and subjunctives

Philosophical Studies 148 (3):323 - 341 (2010)
Abstract
It is generally agreed that dispositions cannot be analyzed in terms of simple subjunctive conditionals (because of what are called “masked dispositions” and “finkish dispositions”). I here defend a qualified subjunctive account of dispositions according to which an object is disposed to Φ when conditions C obtain if and only if, if conditions C were to obtain, then the object would Φ ceteris paribus . I argue that this account does not fall prey to the objections that have been raised in the literature.
Keywords Disposition  Mask  Fink  Subjunctive  Counterfactual   Ceteris paribus
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,085
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Rudolf Carnap (1936). Testability and Meaning. Philosophy of Science 3 (4):419-471.
Fred Dretske (1981). The Pragmatic Dimension of Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 40 (3):363--378.

View all 23 references

Citations of this work BETA
Gabriele Contessa (2013). Dispositions and Interferences. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):401-419.
Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

200 ( #2,763 of 1,101,622 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

29 ( #3,904 of 1,101,622 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.