Does doxastic transparency support evidentialism?

Dialectica 62 (4):541-547 (2008)
Nishi Shah has recently argued that transparency in doxastic deliberation supports a strict version of evidentialism about epistemic reasons. I argue that Shah's argument relies on a principle that is incompatible with the strict version of evidentialism Shah wishes to advocate.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2008.01161.x
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas Kelly (2003). Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):612–640.
Nishi Shah (2006). A New Argument for Evidentialism. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):481–498.

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Conor McHugh (2013). The Illusion of Exclusivity. European Journal of Philosophy 23 (3).

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