Doxastic Voluntarism and Epistemic Deontology

Acta Analytica 15 (1):25-56 (2000)
Abstract
Epistemic deontology is the view that the concept of epistemic justification is deontological: a justified belief is, by definition, an epistemically permissible belief. I defend this view against the argument from doxastic involuntarism, according to which our doxastic attitudes are not under our voluntary control, and thus are not proper objects for deontological evaluation. I argue that, in order to assess this argument, we must distinguish between a compatibilist and a libertarian construal of the concept of voluntary control. If we endorse a compatibilist construal, it turns out that we enjoy voluntary control over our doxastic attitudes after all. If, on the other hand, we endorse a libertarian construal, the result is that, for our doxastic attitudes to be suitable objects of deontological evaluation, they need not be under our voluntary control.
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Citations of this work BETA
Rik Peels (forthcoming). Against Doxastic Compatibilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Neil Levy (2007). Doxastic Responsibility. Synthese 155 (1):127 - 155.
Masahiro Yamada (2012). Taking Aim at the Truth. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):47-59.

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