More Problems for MaxCon: Contingent Particularity and Stuff-Thing Coincidence [Book Review]

Acta Analytica 26 (2):135-154 (2011)
Abstract
Ned Markosian argues (Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76:213-228, 1998a; Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82:332-340, 2004a, The Monist 87:405-428, 2004b) that simples are ‘maximally continuous’ entities. This leads him to conclude that there could be non-particular ‘stuff’ in addition to things. I first show how an ensuing debate on this issue McDaniel (Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81(2):265-275, 2003); Markosian (Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82:332-340, 2004a) ended in deadlock. I attempt to break the deadlock. Markosian’s view entails stuff-thing coincidence, which I show is just as problematic as the more oft-discussed thing-thing coincidence. Also, the view entails that every particular is only contingently so. If there is a world W like our own, but with ether, then there would be only one object in W. But, since merely adding ether to a world does not destroy the entities in it, then W contains counterparts of all the entities in the actual world—they just are not things. Hence, if simples are maximally continuous, then every actual particular is only contingently so. This in turn entails the following disjunction: (i) identity is contingent or intransitive, or (ii) there are no things at all in the actual world, or (iii) the distinction between stuff and things is one without a difference. I recommend that we reject this stuff-thing dualism
Keywords Stuff ontology  Substance  Simples  Ordinary objects  Coincidence  Material constitution  Mereology
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,357
External links
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA

    View all 34 references

    Citations of this work BETA

    No citations found.

    Similar books and articles
    Justin Broackes (2006). Substance. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (1):131–166.
    Gregory Fowler (2008). A Gunk-Friendly Maxcon. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):611 – 627.
    Shieva Kleinschmidt (2007). Some Things About Stuff. Philosophical Studies 135 (3):407 - 423.
    Ned Markosian (2004). Soc It to Me? Reply to McDaniel on Maxcon Simples. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (2):332 – 340.
    Kris McDaniel (2003). Against Maxcon Simples. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):265 – 275.
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2009-01-28

    Total downloads

    41 ( #34,894 of 1,088,818 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    1 ( #69,666 of 1,088,818 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.