|Abstract||I argue here that Frege’s eventual view on the relation between sentences and the thoughts they express is that, ideally, a sentence expresses exactly one thought, and a thought is expressed by exactly one (canonical) sentence. This may clash with some mainstream views of Frege, for it has the consequence of de-emphasizing the philosophical significance of the question of how it is possible for someone to regard one sentence as true yet regard another sentence that expresses the same thought as false. This account of Frege was developed by taking a long-range look at his writings over the course of his life.|
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