David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Issues 14 (1):403–425 (2004)
When I take a sip from the coffee in my cup, I can taste that it is sweet. When I hold the cup with my hands, I can feel that it is hot. Why does the experience of feeling that the cup is hot give me justification for believing that the cup is hot?And why does the experience of tasting that the coffee is sweet give me justification for believing that the coffee is sweet?In general terms: Why is it that a sense experience that P is a source of justification—a reason—for believing that P? Call this the Question. I will discuss various answers to the Question, and defend the one I myself favor.
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References found in this work BETA
John R. Searle (1983). Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Chris Tucker (2014). If Dogmatists Have a Problem with Cognitive Penetration, You Do Too. Dialectica 68 (1):35-62.
John M. DePoe (2011). Defeating the Self-Defeat Argument for Phenomenal Conservativism. Philosophical Studies 152 (3):347-359.
Logan Paul Gage (2016). Phenomenal Conservatism and the Subject’s Perspective Objection. Acta Analytica 31 (1):43-58.
Peter J. Markie (2006). Epistemically Appropriate Perceptual Belief. Noûs 40 (1):118-142.
Andrew Cullison (2010). What Are Seemings? Ratio 23 (3):260-274.
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Alvin Goldman, Reliabilism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
David Henderson, Terry Horgan & Matjaž Potrč (2007). Transglobal Evidentialism-Reliabilism. Acta Analytica 22 (4):281-300.
Declan Smithies (2012). Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):273-300.
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Steven Geisz (2011). Saṃsāra in a Coffee Cup : Self, Suffering, and the Karma of Waking Up. In Scott F. Parker & Michael W. Austin (eds.), Coffee - Philosophy for Everyone: Grounds for Debate. Wiley-Blackwell
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