David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Issues 14 (1):403–425 (2004)
When I take a sip from the coffee in my cup, I can taste that it is sweet. When I hold the cup with my hands, I can feel that it is hot. Why does the experience of feeling that the cup is hot give me justification for believing that the cup is hot?And why does the experience of tasting that the coffee is sweet give me justification for believing that the coffee is sweet?In general terms: Why is it that a sense experience that P is a source of justification—a reason—for believing that P? Call this the Question. I will discuss various answers to the Question, and defend the one I myself favor.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
B. J. C. Madison (2010). Epistemic Internalism. Philosophy Compass 5 (10):840-853.
Matthew Skene (2013). Seemings and the Possibility of Epistemic Justification. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):539-559.
Peter J. Markie (2006). Epistemically Appropriate Perceptual Belief. Noûs 40 (1):118-142.
John M. DePoe (2011). Defeating the Self-Defeat Argument for Phenomenal Conservativism. Philosophical Studies 152 (3):347-359.
Andrew Cullison (2010). What Are Seemings? Ratio 23 (3):260-274.
Similar books and articles
Laurence BonJour, Epistemological Problems of Perception. Stanford Online Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Kristopher G. Phillips (2011). The Unexamined Cup is Not Worth Drinking. In Scott F. Parker & Michael W. Austin (eds.), Coffee - Philosophy for Everyone: Grounds for Debate. Wiley-Blackwell.
Alvin Goldman, Reliabilism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
David Henderson, Terry Horgan & Matjaž Potrč (2007). Transglobal Evidentialism-Reliabilism. Acta Analytica 22 (4):281-300.
Declan Smithies (2012). Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):273-300.
Dan D. Crawford (2002). Ultra-Strong Internalism and the Reliabilist Insight. Journal of Philosophical Research 27:311-328.
Steven Geisz (2011). Saṃsāra in a Coffee Cup : Self, Suffering, and the Karma of Waking Up. In Scott F. Parker & Michael W. Austin (eds.), Coffee - Philosophy for Everyone: Grounds for Debate. Wiley-Blackwell.
Anthony Brueckner (2009). Internalism and Evidence of Reliability. Philosophia 37 (1):47-54.
Robert Audi (1991). Structural Justification. Journal of Philosophical Research 16:473-492.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads105 ( #9,399 of 1,096,479 )
Recent downloads (6 months)10 ( #15,986 of 1,096,479 )
How can I increase my downloads?