David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:352 - 363 (1986)
Putnam presents a Peircean characterization of truth in an attempt to avoid relativism, which he argues is incoherent. I argue that Putnam has not avoided relativism. According to Putnam's theory of understanding, we must understand all claims concerning a Peircean community in terms of our own experiences and in terms of our own standards of rational assertability. Truth simply collapses into warranted assertability. At this point Putnam appeals to the objectivity of our standards of assertability. But Putnam's notion of "objectivity for us" is a notion of objectivity which the relativist can happily adopt. Putnam's failure to provide more than a superficial distinction between internal realism and relativism means that internal realism faces the same problems which Putnam directs at "self-refuting" relativism.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Jeffery L. Johnson (1991). Making Noises in Counterpoint or Chorus: Putnam's Rejection of Relativism. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 34 (3):323--45.
Janet Folina (1995). Putnam, Realism and Truth. Synthese 103 (2):141--52.
Lieven Decock & Igor Douven (2012). Putnam's Internal Realism: A Radical Restatement. Topoi 31 (1):111-120.
Mari Mikkola (2010). Is Everything Relative? Anti-Realism, Truth and Feminism. In A. Hazlett (ed.), New Waves in Metaphysics. Palgrave-Macmillan
Anders Öberg (2011). Hilary Putnam on Meaning and Necessity. Dissertation, Uppsala University
Luca Moretti (2003). Putnam's Internal Realism. Dissertation, King's College London
Valer Ambrus (1999). Is Putnam's Causal Theory of Meaning Compatible with Internal Realism? Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 30 (1):1-16.
Jürgen Dümont (1999). Putnam's Model-Theoretic Argument(S). A Detailed Reconstruction. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 30 (2):341-364.
Mark Sprevak & Christina McLeish (2004). Magic, Semantics, and Putnam's Vat Brains. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 35 (2):227-236.
Hilary Putnam (1982). A Defense of Internal Realism. In James Conant (ed.), Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy. Harvard University Press 30--42.
Manuel Bremer (1999). Truth In Internal Realism. In Julian Nida-Rümelin (ed.), Rationality, Realism and Revision.
Kenneth R. Westphal (2003). ‘Can Pragmatic Realists Argue Transcendentally?’. In John Shook (ed.), Pragmatic Naturalism and Realism. Prometheus
Added to index2011-05-29
Total downloads9 ( #290,390 of 1,778,394 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #291,352 of 1,778,394 )
How can I increase my downloads?