Negative Truth and Falsehood

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt1):45 - 71 (2007)
Abstract
What makes it true when we say that something is not the case? Truthmaker maximalists think that every truth has a truthmaker—some fact in the world—that makes it true. No such facts can be found for the socalled negative truths. If a proposition is true when it has a truthmaker, then it would be false when it has no truthmaker. I therefore argue that negative truths, such as t<p>, are best understood as falsehoods, f<p>.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,357
External links
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA

    No references found.

    Citations of this work BETA
    Mark Jago (2011). Setting the Facts Straight. Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (1):33-54.
    Robin Stenwall (2010). Causal Truthmaking. Metaphysica 11 (2):211-222.
    Similar books and articles
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2010-08-30

    Total downloads

    39 ( #36,978 of 1,088,428 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    5 ( #20,058 of 1,088,428 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.