Negative Truth and Falsehood

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt1):45 - 71 (2007)
Abstract
What makes it true when we say that something is not the case? Truthmaker maximalists think that every truth has a truthmaker—some fact in the world—that makes it true. No such facts can be found for the socalled negative truths. If a proposition is true when it has a truthmaker, then it would be false when it has no truthmaker. I therefore argue that negative truths, such as t<p>, are best understood as falsehoods, f<p>.
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Citations of this work BETA
Mark Jago (2011). Setting the Facts Straight. Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (1):33-54.
Robin Stenwall (2010). Causal Truthmaking. Metaphysica 11 (2):211-222.
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