Knowledge and skepticism
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Skeptics claim that we know radically less than we think we do. For example, skeptics might claim that we have next to no knowledge of the past, the future, or other minds. Here we will consider the skeptical claim that we have next to no knowledge of the external world: the world of physical objects that we at least seem to perceive. One well-known argument in support of this claim appeals to the possibility of being a BIV: a brain in a vat. According to the BIV Hypothesis, you are a mere BIV without a normal body. This of course means, among other things, that you don't have hands. The nerve endings of your brain are stimulated in a manner so sophisticated that the perfect illusion of a normal life is generated. Let's distinguish between the..
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