Leibniz, creation and the best of all possible worlds

Leibniz argued that God would not create a world unless it was the best possible world. I defend Leibniz’s argument. I then consider whether God could refrain from creating if there were no best possible world. I argue that God, on pain of contradiction, could not refrain from creating in such a situation. I conclude that either this is the best possible world or God is not our creator.
Keywords God  Creation  Best possible world
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DOI 10.2307/27646240
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Edward Wierenga (2002). The Freedom of God. Faith and Philosophy 19 (4):425-436.

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