Online research in philosophy

In this essay an effort is made to answer the question of what function psychology and psychiatry have in merleau-ponty's ``the structure of behavior and phenomenology of perception''. it is argued that in his first book merleau-ponty tried to present a philosophical critique of the behaviorist and gestaltist interpretations of empirical psychology, whereas ``phenomenology of perception'' attempts to make a contribution to philosophical anthropology which in many instances employs analyses which belong to phenomenological psychology, the regional ontology of psychic phenomena.

Introduction to sensory psychology, by C. Mueller.--Some reflections on brain and mind, by R. Brain.--In search of the engram, by K. Lashly.--Cerebral organization and behavior, by R. W. Sperry.--Relations between the central nervous system and the peripheral organs, by E. von Holst.--Effects of the Gestalt revolution, by J. E. Hochberg.--Seeing in depth, by R. L. Gregory.--The stimulus variables for visual depth perception, by J. J. Gibson.--The elaboration of the universe, by J. Piaget.--Visual perception approached by the method of stabilized images, by R. M. Pritchard, W. Heron, and D. O. Hebb.--Philosophy as rigorous science, by E. Husserl.--The "sensation" as a unit of experience, by M. Merleau-Ponty.--The phenomenology of perception: perceptual implications, by A. Gurwitsch.--The expression of thinking, by E. W. Straus.--The concept of group and the theory of perception, by E. Cassirer.--Norm and pathology of I-world relations, by E. W. Straus.--The metaphysical in man, by M. Merleau-Ponty.--Cultural differences in the perception of geometric illusions, by M. H. Segall, D. T. Campbell, and M. J. Herskovits.--The interpretive cortex, by W. Penfield.--Recovery from early blindness: a case study, by R. L. Gregory and J. G. Wallace.--Visual disturbances after perceptual isolation, by W. Heron, B. K. Doane, and T. H. Scott.

This essay traces the development of the concept of style in merleau- ponty's thought as both an aesthetic and an ontological category. the importance of this concept is that what merleau-ponty first noticed as the signifying potential of style in painting develops into a general category descriptive of a more comprehensive aspect of our being-in-the-world. style is crucial for merleau-ponty's thought since it provides a way of describing the foundational field of meaning that perception discloses, and also of characterizing the nature of existential coherence under the conditions of finitude.

The fact that there is no blending into one feeling, as is the case in [the] feeling of such diverse levels of depth, points to the fact that feelings are ...

According to current cognitive linguistic theory, the abstract notion of TIME in many languages of the world is expressed through a metonymic relation involving direc-tion, irreversibility, continuity, segmentation, and measurability and one of two possible versions of the TIME AS ORIENTATION IN SPACE metaphor: either the observer moves or time does. In Phenomenology of Perception (1945), Merleau-Ponty argues for the possibility of understanding what he calls 'our primordial experience'of time through an exploration, analysis, comparison, and evaluation of the different metaphors for time, not as they exist in themselves but as they are grounded in what other cognitive linguists have explored with respect to subjectivity, concept formation, and conceptual integration. This 'primordial experience' of time is possible because of the embodiment of ourselves in the world and gives rise to Merleau-Ponty’s theory of an ontology of the flesh; the fact that we are 'of' rather than 'in' the world gives rise to his theory of time as depth. In this paper, I show how Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of time might 1) clarify the picture Lakoff and Johnson give of the existence of time and 2) provide a philosophical foundation that integrates various contemporary cognitive linguistic theories.

While poststructuralist feminist theorists have clarified our understanding of the gendered subject as produced through a matrix of language, culture, and psycho-sexual affects, they have found agency difficult to ground. I argue that this is because in these theories the body has served primarily as an inscribed surface. In response to this surface body, particular to this age, I have turned to Merleau-Ponty's concept of depth which allows us to theorize the agency crucial to feminist politics. While the poststructuralists' rejection of depth is largely due to its roots in Cartesian rationality, depth is much more than this. Rather than allowing for the impossibility of political action, depth means that as bodily moving and acting subjects we are part of Being, and thus part of the questions raised in this age, even if it is a mark of this age that this tends to be forgotten.

Drawing on the philosophies of Merleau-Ponty and Bergon, as well as contemporary psychology to develop a renewed account of the moving, perceiving body, the ...

This essay argues that Merleau-Ponty’s concept of nature as a “privileged expression” of ontology provides the conceptual support for a more responsible attitude toward humans and nature. Furthermore, this concept of nature needs to be viewed in the light of a more profound concept that opens a new vision of the human being’s place in the world, namely Merleau-Ponty’s fields of perception. Shiva’s writings pertaining to the environment gain a more profound, yet critical, understanding when viewed in this way. Similarly, Merleau-Ponty’s attempts “to reconcile the old world and the new” (MP 1964, 4) through implementation of his phenomenology to political and ethical questions is reviewed anew.