David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (4):440-463 (2006)
This article examines methodological individualism in terms of the theory that invariance under intervention is the signal feature of generalizations that serve as a basis for causal explanation. This theory supports the holist contention that macro-level generalizations can explain, but it also suggests a defense of methodological individualism on the grounds that greater range of invariance under intervention entails deeper explanation. Although this individualist position is not threatened by multiple-realizability, an argument for it based on rational choice theory is called into question by experimental results concerning preference reversals. Key Words: methodological individualism mechanisms explanation invariance preference reversal.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Peter Spirtes (2011). Intervention, Determinism, and the Causal Minimality Condition. Synthese 182 (3):335-347.
J. Vromen, Jack (2010). MICRO-Foundations in Strategic Management: Squaring Coleman's Diagram. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 73 (3):365 - 383.
Similar books and articles
Mario Bunge (2000). Ten Modes of Individualism--None of Which Works--And Their Alternatives. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 30 (3):384-406.
Raimo Tuomela (1990). Methodological Individualism and Explanation. Philosophy of Science 57 (1):133-140.
Alban Bouvier (2002). An Epistemological Plea for Methodological Individualism and Rational Choice Theory in Cognitive Rhetoric. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (1):51-70.
Justin Schwartz (1993). Functional Explanation and Metaphysical Individualism. Philosophy of Science 60 (2):278-301.
David Henderson (2005). Norms, Invariance, and Explanatory Relevance. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (3):324-338.
Harold Kincaid (1986). Reduction, Explanation, and Individualism. Philosophy of Science 53 (4):492-513.
Jim Woodward (2001). Law and Explanation in Biology: Invariance is the Kind of Stability That Matters. Philosophy of Science 68 (1):1-20.
Henry Jackman (1998). Individualism and Interpretation. Southwest Philosophy Review 14 (1):31-38.
R. Keith Sawyer (2003). Nonreductive Individualism Part II—Social Causation. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 33 (2):203-224.
Ron McClamrock (1991). Methodological Individualism Considered as a Constitutive Principle of Scientific Inquiry. Philosophical Psychology 4 (3):343-54.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads27 ( #62,756 of 1,098,129 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #112,729 of 1,098,129 )
How can I increase my downloads?