David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind and Language 25 (3):279-297 (2010)
In the last few years, nativist, modular views of moral cognition have been influential. This paper shares the view that normative cognition develops robustly, and is probably an adaptation. But it develops an alternative view of the developmental basis of moral cognition, based on the idea that adults scaffold moral development by organising the learning environment of the next generation. In addition, I argue that the modular nativist picture has no plausible account of the role of explicit moral judgement, and that no persuasive version of the ‘poverty of the stimulus' applies to moral cognition
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References found in this work BETA
Noam A. Chomsky (1980). Rules and Representations. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (127):1-61.
Jesse J. Prinz (2007). The Emotional Construction of Morals. Oxford University Press.
Marc Hauser (2006). Moral Minds: How Nature Designed Our Universal Sense of Right and Wrong. Harper Collins.
Shaun Nichols (2004). Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Kim Sterelny & Ben Fraser (forthcoming). Evolution and Moral Realism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv060.
Kevin Brosnan (2011). Do the Evolutionary Origins of Our Moral Beliefs Undermine Moral Knowledge? Biology and Philosophy 26 (1):51-64.
Benjamin James Fraser (2014). Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and the Reliability of Moral Cognition. Philosophical Studies 168 (2):457-473.
Stephen M. Downes (2013). No Magic Bullet Explains the Evolution of Unique Human Traits. Biological Theory 8 (1):15-19.
Simon Fitzpatrick (2014). Distinguishing Between Three Versions of the Doctrine of Double Effect Hypothesis in Moral Psychology. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (4):505-525.
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