No Norm needed: On the aim of belief

Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):499–516 (2006)
Abstract
Does transparency in doxastic deliberation entail a constitutive norm of correctness governing belief, as Shah and Velleman argue? No, because this presupposes an implausibly strong relation between normative judgements and motivation from such judgements, ignores our interest in truth, and cannot explain why we pay different attention to how much justification we have for our beliefs in different contexts. An alternative account of transparency is available: transparency can be explained by the aim one necessarily adopts in deliberating about whether to believe that p. To show this, I reconsider the role of the concept of belief in doxastic deliberation, and I defuse 'the teleologian's dilemma'.
Keywords Belief  Normativity  Truth
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References found in this work BETA
Pamela Hieronymi (2006). Controlling Attitudes. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):45-74.

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Citations of this work BETA
Neil Van Leeuwen (2009). The Motivational Role of Belief. Philosophical Papers 38 (2):219 - 246.
Andrew Reisner (2009). Abandoning the Buck Passing Analysis of Final Value. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):379 - 395.

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