David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 58 (2):147-167 (1991)
It has been repeatedly argued, most recently by Nicholas Maxwell, that the special theory of relativity is incompatible with the view that the future is in some degree undetermined; and Maxwell contends that this is a reason to reject that theory. In the present paper, an analysis is offered of the notion of indeterminateness (or "becoming") that is uniquely appropriate to the special theory of relativity, in the light of a set of natural conditions upon such a notion; and reasons are given for regarding this conception as (not just formally consistent with relativity theory, but also) philosophically reasonable. The bearings upon Maxwell's program for quantum theory are briefly considered
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John Earman (2008). Reassessing the Prospects for a Growing Block Model of the Universe. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22 (2):135 – 164.
Ian Gibson & Oliver Pooley (2006). Relativistic Persistence. Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):157–198.
Charles Parsons (2010). Gödel and Philosophical Idealism. Philosophia Mathematica 18 (2):166-192.
James Harrington (2005). Discussion Note: K. Miller “Enduring Special Relativity”. Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (2):241-244.
David Wallace (2002). Worlds in the Everett Interpretation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 33 (4):637-661.
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