On relativity theory and openness of the future

Philosophy of Science 58 (2):147-167 (1991)
Abstract
It has been repeatedly argued, most recently by Nicholas Maxwell, that the special theory of relativity is incompatible with the view that the future is in some degree undetermined; and Maxwell contends that this is a reason to reject that theory. In the present paper, an analysis is offered of the notion of indeterminateness (or "becoming") that is uniquely appropriate to the special theory of relativity, in the light of a set of natural conditions upon such a notion; and reasons are given for regarding this conception as (not just formally consistent with relativity theory, but also) philosophically reasonable. The bearings upon Maxwell's program for quantum theory are briefly considered
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DOI 10.1086/289609
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Ian Gibson & Oliver Pooley (2006). Relativistic Persistence. Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):157–198.
David Wallace (2002). Worlds in the Everett Interpretation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 33 (4):637-661.
Gustavo E. Romero & Daniela Pérez (2014). Presentism Meets Black Holes. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 4 (3):293-308.

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