On the notion of effectiveness

History and Philosophy of Logic 1 (1-2):209-230 (1980)
This paper focuses on two notions of effectiveness which are not treated in detail elsewhere. Unlike the standard computability notion, which is a property of functions themselves, both notions of effectiveness are properties of interpreted linguistic presentations of functions. It is shown that effectiveness is epistemically at least as basic as computability in the sense that decisions about computability normally involve judgments concerning effectiveness. There are many occurrences of the present notions in the writings of logicians; moreover, consideration of these notions can contribute to the clarification and, perhaps, solution of various philosophical problems, confusions and disputes
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DOI 10.1080/01445348008837011
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References found in this work BETA
Alonzo Church (1944). Introduction to Mathematical Logic. London, H. Milford, Oxford University Press.
Jean Van Heijenoort (ed.) (1967). From Frege to Gödel. Cambridge, Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Stewart Shapiro (1983). Remarks on the Development of Computability. History and Philosophy of Logic 4 (1-2):203-220.
M. Detlefsen (1988). Essay Review. History and Philosophy of Logic 9 (1):93-105.

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