Philosophy for the Rest of Cognitive Science

Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):425-437 (2011)
Cognitive science has always included multiple methodologies and theoretical commitments. The philosophy of cognitive science should embrace, or at least acknowledge, this diversity. Bechtel’s (2009a) proposed philosophy of cognitive science, however, applies only to representationalist and mechanist cognitive science, ignoring the substantial minority of dynamically oriented cognitive scientists. As an example of nonrepresentational, dynamical cognitive science, we describe strong anticipation as a model for circadian systems (Stepp & Turvey, 2009). We then propose a philosophy of science appropriate to nonrepresentational, dynamical cognitive science
Keywords Representation  Philosophy of science  Mechanism  Explanation  Dynamical systems
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DOI 10.1111/j.1756-8765.2011.01143.x
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Keld Stehr Nielsen (2006). Dynamical Explanation in Cognitive Science. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 37 (1):139 - 163.

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