David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):667-672 (1996)
In his introduction to Philosophical Naturalism, Papineau mentions that he had intended, at one time, to call the book Philosophical Physicalism. In the end, he writes, he rejected that title, partly for fear that the term "physicalism" might have suggested commitment to a metaphysical position tied closely to the ontology and categories dictated by current physics, a commitment he is anxious not to incur; and partly because the concerns of the book as a whole are wider than would have been suggested by the rejected title. Nevertheless, the early chapters of the book make it clear that the first choice of title would have been, in some ways, a more accurate guide to the character of Papineau's convictions about a number of central issues in metaphysics, philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. Specifically, Papineau's views about the relationships between what he calls "the special" and the physical in general, and between the psychological and the physical in particular, fall into a sector of naturalist territory that is indisputably physicalistic. I shall concentrate here on two lines of thought from these early chapters: the first, Papineau's characterisation of physicalism, by means of the two doctrines he calls "supervenience" and "token congruence", in Chapter 1; the second, a puzzle he raises in Chapter 2 for those who are content with a physicalism sufficiently weak to allow for variable realisation
|Keywords||Epistemology Naturalism Physicalism Supervenience Truth Papineau, D|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Warren Shrader (2008). On the Relevance of Supervenience Theses to Physicalism. Acta Analytica 23 (3):257-271.
Robert Kirk (1996). Strict Implication, Supervenience, and Physicalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):244-57.
Ricardo Restrepo (2012). Thinking About Physicalism. Open Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):84-88.
Ricardo Restrepo (2012). Two Myths of Psychophysical Reductionism. Open Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):75-83.
David Papineau (1995). Arguments for Supervenience and Physical Realization. In Elias E. Savellos & U. Yalcin (eds.), Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.
Barbara Montero & David Papineau (2005). A Defense of the Via Negativa Argument for Physicalism. Analysis 65 (287):233-237.
Tim Crane (1991). Why Indeed? Papineau on Supervenience. Analysis 51 (January):32-7.
Paul K. Moser (1996). Physicalism and Mental Causes: Contra Papineau. Analysis 56 (4):263-67.
Jessica M. Wilson (2005). Supervenience-Based Formulations of Physicalism. Noûs 39 (3):426-459.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads42 ( #48,554 of 1,679,396 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #183,757 of 1,679,396 )
How can I increase my downloads?