Pleonastic possible worlds

Philosophical Studies 164 (3):767-789 (2013)
Abstract
The role of possible worlds in philosophy is hard to overestimate. Nevertheless, their nature and existence is very controversial. This is particularly serious, since their standard applications depend on there being sufficiently many of them. The paper develops an account of possible worlds on which it is particularly easy to believe in their existence: an account of possible worlds as pleonastic entities. Pleonastic entities are entities whose existence can be validly inferred from statements that neither refer to nor quantify over them as a matter of conceptual necessity. Definitions are proposed that ensure that this is the case for possible worlds
Keywords Modality  Possible worlds, account of  Pleonastic entities  Schiffer, Stephen
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References found in this work BETA
Jon Barwise (1981). Scenes and Other Situations. Journal of Philosophy 78 (7):369-397.
Jon Barwise & John Perry (1981). Situations and Attitudes. Journal of Philosophy 78 (11):668-691.

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