Responses to Driver, Hooker, and Norcross

Abstract
In their critiques of my book, Julia Driver, Brad Hooker, and Alastair Norcross have focused on my argument from rationality to morality that attempts to complete the Kantian project of justifying morality and my use of the “ought” implies “can” principle to reconcile the differences between Kantian and utilitarian ethical perspectives. While treating respectfully the ingenious arguments and counterexamples that each of my critics employs against my views, I explain, in detail, why their arguments and counterexamples do not work against my views, properly interpreted, although they do suggest ways that I might better present my views in the future in order to attract more adherents to my reconciliationist project
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Similar books and articles
Brad Hooker (2005). Some Questions Not to Be Begged in Moral Theory. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 19 (2):277-284.
Phillip L. Quinn (1998). The Virtue of Obedience. Faith and Philosophy 15 (4):445-461.
Alastair Norcross (1996). Rationality and the Sure-Thing Principle. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):324 – 327.
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