Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):143-161 (2007)
|Abstract||A modest transcendental argument is one that sets out merely to establish how things need to appear to us or how we need to believe them to be, rather than how things are. Stroud's claim to have established that all transcendental arguments must be modest in this way is criticised and rejected. However, a different case for why we should abandon ambitious transcendental arguments is presented: namely, that when it comes to establishing claims about how things are, there is no reason to prefer transcendental arguments to arguments that rely on the evidence of the senses, making the former redundant in a way that modest transcendental arguments, which have a different kind of sceptical target, are not.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Oskari Kuusela (2008). Transcendental Arguments and the Problem of Dogmatism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (1):57 – 75.
James Skidmore (2002). Skepticism About Practical Reason: Transcendental Arguments and Their Limits. Philosophical Studies 109 (2):121 - 141.
Stephen Clarke (2010). Transcendental Realisms in the Philosophy of Science: On Bhaskar and Cartwright. Synthese 173 (3).
Mark Sacks (2005). The Nature of Transcendental Arguments. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13 (4):439 – 460.
Adrian Bardon (2005). Performative Transcendental Arguments. Philosophia 33 (1-4):69-95.
John J. Callanan (2011). Making Sense of Doubt: Strawson's Anti-Scepticism. Theoria 77 (3):261-278.
Robert Stern (ed.) (1999). Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects. Oxford University Press.
Anthony Brueckner (1996). Modest Transcendental Arguments. Philosophical Perspectives 10 (Metaphysics):265-280.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads121 ( #4,170 of 549,198 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #19,303 of 549,198 )
How can I increase my downloads?