David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):697-698 (2000)
Stanovich & West rely for many of their conclusions on correlations of reasoning tasks with SAT scores. The conclusions they draw are suspect because the SAT is not a particularly good measure of so-called g; g is not necessarily causal, SAT scores are no arbiter of what is true, and in any case it is not suprising that reasoning tests correlate with reasoning tests.
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