Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects

Oxford University Press (1999)
In this volume of fourteen new essays, a distinguished team of philosophers offer a broad and stimulating examination of the nature, role, and value of transcendental arguments. Transcendental arguments aim to show that what is doubted or denied by the sceptic must be the case, as a condition for the possibility of experience, language, or thought. The essays consider how successful such arguments are as a response to sceptical problems.
Keywords Transcendentalism
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Reprint years 2000, 2003
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Call number B823.T67 1999
ISBN(s) 0198238371   9780198238379   0199261563   9780199261567
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Robert Hanna (2005). Kant and Nonconceptual Content. European Journal of Philosophy 13 (2):247-290.
Mark Sacks (2005). The Nature of Transcendental Arguments. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13 (4):439 – 460.

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