The Ontology of Mind: Events, Processes, and States
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Oxford University Press (1997)
Helen Steward puts forward a radical critique of the foundations of contemporary philosophy of mind, arguing that it relies too heavily on insecure assumptions about the sorts of things there are in the mind--events, processes, and states. She offers a fresh investigation of these three categories, clarifying the distinctions between them, and argues that the category of state has been very widely and seriously misunderstood.
|Keywords||Causation Change Event Metaphysics Mind Ontology|
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|Call number||BD418.3.S74 1997|
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Jennifer Hornsby (2012). Actions and Activity. Philosophical Issues 22 (1):233-245.
Zoe Drayson (2012). The Uses and Abuses of the Personal/Subpersonal Distinction. Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):1-18.
Ralph Wedgwood (2006). The Normative Force of Reasoning. Noûs 40 (4):660–686.
Ofra Magidor (forthcoming). Category Mistakes and Figurative Language. Philosophical Studies.
Helen Steward (2012). Actions as Processes. Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):373-388.
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