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The concept of a proposition is important in several areas of philosophy and central to the philosophy of language. This collection of readings investigates many different philosophical issues concerning the nature of propositions and the ways they have been regarded through the years. Reflecting both the history of the topic and the range of contemporary views, the book includes articles from Bertrand Russell, Gottlob Frege, the Russell-Frege Correspondence, Alonzo Church, David Kaplan, John Perry, Saul Kripke, Hilary Putnam, Mark Richard, Scott Soames, and Nathan Salmon.

Shaughan La Vine, Understanding the Infinite.Cambridge, Massachussets :Harvard University Press, 1994, ix + 372 pp.£31.95/$47.95 B.Russell, Foundations of logic 1903?05, The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, Volume 4, Edited by Urquhart, A.with the assistance of Lewis, A.C.London and New York:Routledge, 1994, Hi+ 743 pp.£100 Ray Monk and Anthony Palmer (eds.), Bertrand Russell and the Origins of Analytical Philosophy.Introduction by Ray Monk and Anthony Palmer.Bristol, U.K.:Thoemmes Press, 1996. xvi + 383 pp.£48.00/$78.00 (cloth); £16.95/$29.95 (paper) T.J.Holopainen, Dialectic & Theology in the Eleventh Century.Leiden:E.J.Brill, 1996. vii+171pp.$78.

Between 1903 and 1918 Russell made a number of attempts to understand the unity of the proposition, but his attempts all foundered on his failure clearly to distinguish between different senses in which the relation R might be said to relate a and b in the proposition aRb: he failed to distinguish between the relation as truth-maker and the relation as unifier, and consequently committed himself again and again to the unacceptable consequence that only true propositions are genuinely unified. There is an anticipation of this confusion in the writings of the fourteenth-century philosopher Richard Brinkley.

Shaughan La Vine, Understanding the Infinite.Cambridge, Massachussets :Harvard University Press, 1994, ix + 372 pp.£31.95/$47.95 B.Russell, Foundations of logic 1903?05, The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, Volume 4, Edited by Urquhart, A.with the assistance of Lewis, A.C.London and New York:Routledge, 1994, Hi+ 743 pp.£100 Ray Monk and Anthony Palmer (eds.), Bertrand Russell and the Origins of Analytical Philosophy.Introduction by Ray Monk and Anthony Palmer.Bristol, U.K.:Thoemmes Press, 1996. xvi + 383 pp.£48.00/$78.00 (cloth); £16.95/$29.95 (paper) T.J.Holopainen, Dialectic & Theology in the Eleventh Century.Leiden:E.J.Brill, 1996. vii+171pp.$78.

In Bertrand Russell’s The Principles of Mathematics and related works, the notion of a proposition plays an important role; it is by analyzing propositions, showing what kinds of constituents they have, that Russell arrives at his core logical concepts. At this time, his conception of proposition contains both a conventional and an unconventional part. The former is the view that propositions are the ultimate truth-bearers; the latter is the view that the constituents of propositions are “worldly” entities. In the latter respect, Russellian propositions are akin to states-of-affairs on some robust understanding of these entities. The idea of Russellian propositions is well known, at least in outline. Not so well known is his treatment of truth, which nevertheless grows directly out of this notion of proposition. For the early Russell, the import of truth is primarily metaphysical, rather than semantic; reversing the usual direction of explanation, he holds that truth is explanatory of what is the case rather than vice versa. That is, what properties a thing has and what relations it bears to other things is determined, metaphysically speaking, by there being a suitable array of true and false propositions. In the present paper, this doctrine is examined for its content and motivation. To show that it plays a genuine role in Russell’s early metaphysics and logic, I examine its consequences for (1) the possibility of truth-definitions and (2) the problem of the unity of the proposition. I shall draw a few somewhat tentative conclusions about where Russell stood vis-à-vis his metaphysics of propositions, suggesting a possible source of dissatisfaction that may have played a role in his eventual rejection of his early notion of proposition.

It is widely assumed that Russell's problems with the unity of the proposition were recurring and insoluble within the framework of the logical theory of his Principles of Mathematics. By contrast, Frege's functional analysis of thoughts (grounded in a type-theoretic distinction between concepts and objects) is commonly assumed to provide a solution to the problem or, at least, a means of avoiding the difficulty altogether. The Fregean solution is unavailable to Russell because of his commitment to the thesis that there is only one ultimate ontological category. This, combined with Russell's reification of propositions, ensures that he must hold concepts and objects to be of the same logical and ontological type. In this paper I argue that, while Frege's treatment of the unity of the proposition has immediate advantages over Russell's, a deeper consideration of the philosophical underpinnings and metaphysical consequences of the two approaches reveals that Frege's supposed solution is, in fact, far from satisfactory. Russell's repudiation of the Fregean position in the Principles is, I contend, convincing and Russell's own position, despite its problems, conforms to a greater extent than Frege's with common sense and, furthermore, with certain ideas which are central to our understanding of the origins of the analytical tradition.

This book explores an important central thread that unifies Russell's thoughts on logic in two works previously considered at odds with each other, the Principles of Mathematics and the later Principia Mathematica. This thread is Russell's doctrine that logic is an absolutely general science and that any calculus for it must embrace wholly unrestricted variables. The heart of Landini's book is a careful analysis of Russell's largely unpublished "substitutional" theory. On Landini's showing, the substitutional theory reveals the unity of Russell's philosophy of logic and offers new avenues for a genuine solution of the paradoxes plaguing Logicism.

In this article I present a summary of Bertrand Russell's protracted attempts to solve the problem of the unity of the proposition, and explain the significance of the problem for Russell's philosophy. Unlike many other accounts which take the problem to be confined to Russell's early theories of propositional content, I argue that the problem (or variants of it) is a recurring theme throughout the whole of Russell's career.