Mind 119 (475):749-755 (2010)
|Abstract||Kathrin Glüer and Åsa Wikforss (2009) argue that any truth norm for belief, linking the correctness of believing p with the truth of p, is bound to be uninformative, since applying the norm to determine the correctness of a belief as to whether p, would itself require forming such a belief. I argue that this conflates the condition under which the norm deems beliefs correct, with the psychological state an agent must be in to apply the norm. I also show that since the truth norm conflicts with other possible norms that clearly are informative, the truth norm must itself be informative|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Ralph Wedgwood (2002). The Aim of Belief. Philosophical Perspectives 16 (s16):267-97.
Thomas Raleigh (2013). Belief Norms & Blindspots. Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (2):243-269.
Eric Funkhouser (2003). Willing Belief and the Norm of Truth. Philosophical Studies 115 (2):179-95.
James Dreier (1996). Expressivist Embeddings and Minimalist Truth. Philosophical Studies 83 (1):29-51.
Patrick Greenough (2011). Truth-Relativism, Norm-Relativism, and Assertion. In Brown J. & Cappelen H. (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.
Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2006). No Norm Needed: On the Aim of Belief. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):499–516.
Andrei Buleandra (2009). Doxastic Transparency and Prescriptivity. Dialectica 63 (3):325-332.
Conor Mchugh (2012). The Truth Norm of Belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (1):8-30.
K. Gluer & A. Wikforss (2010). The Truth Norm and Guidance: A Reply to Steglich-Petersen. Mind 119 (475):757-761.
Added to index2009-08-03
Total downloads86 ( #8,452 of 549,007 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #25,706 of 549,007 )
How can I increase my downloads?