David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In Michael A. Bishop & Dominic Murphy (eds.), Stich and His Critics. Blackwell. 14--152 (2004)
Humans interpret others. We are able to anticipate both the actions and intentional states of other agents. We do not do so perfectly, but since we are complex and flexible creatures even limited success needs explanation. For some years now Steve Stich (frequently in collaboration with Shaun Nichols) has been both participant in, and observer of, debates about the foundation of these capacities (Stich and Nichols 1992; Stich and Nichols 1995). As a commentator on this debate, Stich (with Nichols) gave explicit and fair-minded sketches of the cognitive architectures presupposed by the various theories of mindreading. As a participant, Stich has mostly been a defender of the theory-theory, the view that normal human agents have an internally represented theory of other agents and they use that theory in interpreting other agents. The main recent rival to this position, simulationism, claims that agents use their own decision-making mechanisms as a model of those of other agents, and derive their predictions by modelling others in something like the way aeronautical engineers derive predictions from the use of scale models in wind-tunnels. Stich has been sceptical about this alternative, for on his view simulation theory makes mistaken predictions about both the development of interpretive competence and about the pattern of interpretive success and failure
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Chad Gonnerman (2008). Reading Conflicted Minds: An Empirical Follow-Up to Knobe and Roedder. Philosophical Psychology 21 (2):193 – 205.
Similar books and articles
A. Goldman (1992). In Defense of the Simulation Theory. Mind and Language 7 (1-2):104-119.
Daniel Kelly & Stephen Stich (2008). Two Theories About the Cognitive Architecture Underlying Morality. In P. Carruthers, S. Stich & S. Laurence (eds.), The Innate Mind, Vol. III, Foundations and the Future. Oxford University Press.
Shaun Nichols & Stephen P. Stich (2003). Reading One's Own Mind: A Cognitive Theory of Self-Awareness. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oup.
John I. Biro & Kirk A. Ludwig (1994). Are There More Than Minimal a Priori Limits on Irrationality? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):89-102.
Kevin Possin (1986). The Case Against Stich's Syntactic Theory of Mind. Philosophical Studies 49 (May):405-18.
Alison Gopnik & Andrew N. Meltzoff (1998). Theories Vs. Modules: To the Max and Beyond: A Reply to Poulin-Dubois and to Stich and Nichols. Mind and Language 13 (3):450-456.
Michael Bishop (2009). Reflections on Cognitive and Epistemic Diversity : Can a Stich in Time Save Quine? In Dominic Murphy & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Stich and His Critics. Wiley-Blackwell.
Robert M. Gordon (1992). Reply to Stich and Nichols. Mind and Language 7 (1-2):87-97.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads24 ( #76,922 of 1,102,075 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #68,222 of 1,102,075 )
How can I increase my downloads?