David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (3):333-355 (2011)
This paper argues that logical inferentialists should reject multiple-conclusion logics. Logical inferentialism is the position that the meanings of the logical constants are determined by the rules of inference they obey. As such, logical inferentialism requires a proof-theoretic framework within which to operate. However, in order to fulfil its semantic duties, a deductive system has to be suitably connected to our inferential practices. I argue that, contrary to an established tradition, multiple-conclusion systems are ill-suited for this purpose because they fail to provide a 'natural' representation of our ordinary modes of inference. Moreover, the two most plausible attempts at bringing multiple conclusions into line with our ordinary forms of reasoning, the disjunctive reading and the bilateralist denial interpretation, are unacceptable by inferentialist standards.
|Keywords||Inferentialism Logical constants Logical consequence Multiple conclusions|
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References found in this work BETA
Robert B. Brandom (1994). Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment. Harvard University Press.
Michael A. E. Dummett (1991). The Logical Basis of Metaphysics. Harvard University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Edwin Mares & Francesco Paoli (2014). Logical Consequence and the Paradoxes. Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (2-3):439-469.
Denis Bonnay & Dag Westerståhl (forthcoming). Compositionality Solves Carnap’s Problem. Erkenntnis:1-19.
David Ripley (2015). Contraction and Closure. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):131-138.
James Trafford (2015). Duality and Inferential Semantics. Axiomathes 25 (4):495-513.
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