What If the Principle of Induction Is Normative? Formal Learning Theory and Hume's Problem

Abstract
This article argues that a successful answer to Hume's problem of induction can be developed from a sub-genre of philosophy of science known as formal learning theory. One of the central concepts of formal learning theory is logical reliability: roughly, a method is logically reliable when it is assured of eventually settling on the truth for every sequence of data that is possible given what we know. I show that the principle of induction (PI) is necessary and sufficient for logical reliability in what I call simple enumerative induction. This answer to Hume's problem rests on interpreting PI as a normative claim justified by a non-empirical epistemic means-ends argument. In such an argument, a rule of inference is shown by mathematical or logical proof to promote a specified epistemic end. Since the proof concerning PI and logical reliability is not based on inductive reasoning, this argument avoids the circularity that Hume argued was inherent in any attempt to justify PI
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    References found in this work BETA
    D. Chart (2000). Discussion. Schulte and Goodman's Riddle. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (1):147-149.
    Bas C. Van Fraassen (2000). The False Hopes of Traditional Epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):253 - 280.

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    Citations of this work BETA
    Daniel Steel (2011). On Not Changing the Problem: A Reply to Howson. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (3):285 - 291.
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