Wide reflective equilibrium as an answer to an objection to moral heuristics

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):561-562 (2005)
Abstract
If, as is not implausible, the correct moral theory is indexed to human capacity for moral reasoning, then the thesis that moral heuristics exist faces a serious objection. This objection can be answered by embracing a wide reflective equilibrium account of the origins of our normative principles of morality.
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