Weighing the aim of belief

Philosophical Studies 145 (3):395 - 405 (2009)
Abstract
The theory of belief, according to which believing that p essentially involves having as an aim or purpose to believe that p truly, has recently been criticised on the grounds that the putative aim of belief does not interact with the wider aims of believers in the ways we should expect of genuine aims. I argue that this objection to the aim theory fails. When we consider a wider range of deliberative contexts concerning beliefs, it becomes obvious that the aim of belief can interact with and be weighed against the wider aims of agents in the ways required for it to be a genuine aim
Keywords Belief  Aims  Deliberation
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References found in this work BETA
Pamela Hieronymi (2006). Controlling Attitudes. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):45-74.
Thomas Kelly (2003). Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):612–640.
David J. Owens (2003). Does Belief Have an Aim? Philosophical Studies 115 (3):283-305.

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Citations of this work BETA
Neil Van Leeuwen (2009). The Motivational Role of Belief. Philosophical Papers 38 (2):219 - 246.
Anthony Robert Booth (2012). Epistemic Ought is a Commensurable Ought. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):n/a-n/a.
Pascal Engel (2013). Sosa on the Normativity of Belief. Philosophical Studies 166 (3):617-624.

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