Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Studies 145 (3):395 - 405 (2009)
|Abstract||The theory of belief, according to which believing that p essentially involves having as an aim or purpose to believe that p truly, has recently been criticised on the grounds that the putative aim of belief does not interact with the wider aims of believers in the ways we should expect of genuine aims. I argue that this objection to the aim theory fails. When we consider a wider range of deliberative contexts concerning beliefs, it becomes obvious that the aim of belief can interact with and be weighed against the wider aims of agents in the ways required for it to be a genuine aim|
|Keywords||Belief Aims Deliberation|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Ralph Wedgwood (2002). The Aim of Belief. Philosophical Perspectives 16 (s16):267-97.
David Velleman (2000). On the Aim of Belief. In , The Possibility of Practical Reason. Oxford University Press.
Masahiro Yamada (2012). Taking Aim at the Truth. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):47-59.
Daniel Whiting (forthcoming). Nothing but the Truth: On the Norms and Aims of Belief. In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief.
Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2006). No Norm Needed: On the Aim of Belief. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):499–516.
David J. Owens (2003). Does Belief Have an Aim? Philosophical Studies 115 (3):283-305.
Ema Sullivan-Bissett & Paul Noordhof (2013). A Defence of Owens' Exclusivity Objection to Beliefs Having Aims. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):453-457.
Conor Mchugh (2011). What Do We Aim At When We Believe? Dialectica 65 (3):369-392.
Daniel Whiting (2012). Does Belief Aim (Only) at the Truth? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):279-300.
Conor McHugh (2012). Belief and Aims. Philosophical Studies 160 (3):425-439.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads79 ( #12,334 of 751,740 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #38,076 of 751,740 )
How can I increase my downloads?