Weighing the aim of belief

Philosophical Studies 145 (3):395 - 405 (2009)
The theory of belief, according to which believing that p essentially involves having as an aim or purpose to believe that p truly, has recently been criticised on the grounds that the putative aim of belief does not interact with the wider aims of believers in the ways we should expect of genuine aims. I argue that this objection to the aim theory fails. When we consider a wider range of deliberative contexts concerning beliefs, it becomes obvious that the aim of belief can interact with and be weighed against the wider aims of agents in the ways required for it to be a genuine aim
Keywords Belief  Aims  Deliberation
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DOI 10.2307/27734489
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References found in this work BETA
Nishi Shah (2003). How Truth Governs Belief. Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.
Pamela Hieronymi (2006). Controlling Attitudes. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):45-74.

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Citations of this work BETA
Conor McHugh (2012). Belief and Aims. Philosophical Studies 160 (3):425-439.
Pascal Engel (2013). Doxastic Correctness. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):199-216.
Conor McHugh (2013). The Illusion of Exclusivity. European Journal of Philosophy 23 (3):n/a-n/a.

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