Philosophical Quarterly 44 (174):83-89 (1994)
|Abstract||By "proper name" I mean a proper name in Frege's sense, i.e., a singular term. The "problem" mentioned in the title is whether the subject-term of an existential statement can be a proper name. I concentrate on examining some of the existing attempts to define "proper name" and conclude that, whatever answer is given to the question just posed, the authors of these attempts (Dummett, C Wright and B Hale) will have to modify some of their beliefs. My own favored solution is to say that it can, sometimes denoting a non-existent object|
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