After the fall: Religious capacities and the error theory of morality

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (6):751-752 (2004)
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Abstract

The target article proposes an error theory for religious belief. In contrast, moral beliefs are typically not counterintuitive, and some moral cognition and motivation is functional. Error theories for moral belief try to reduce morality to nonmoral psychological capacities because objective moral beliefs seem too fragile in a competitive environment. An error theory for religious belief makes this unnecessary.

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Author Profiles

John Collier
University of KwaZulu-Natal
Michael Stingl
University of Lethbridge

Citations of this work

Evolutionary Moral Realism.John Collier & Michael Stingl - 2013 - Biological Theory 7 (3):218-226.

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