David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy of Science 45 (December):499-518 (1978)
It is argued that the intuitively sanctioned distinction between beliefs and non-belief states that play a role in the proximate causal history of beliefs is a distinction worth preserving in cognitive psychology. The intuitive distinction is argued to rest on a pair of features exhibited by beliefs but not by subdoxastic states. These are access to consciousness and inferential integration. Harman's view, which denies the distinction between beliefs and subdoxastic states, is discussed and criticized
|Keywords||Belief Epistemology Psychology Harman, G|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Ned Block (1995). On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Noam A. Chomsky (1980). Rules and Representations. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (127):1-61.
Zenon W. Pylyshyn (1980). Computation and Cognition: Issues in the Foundation of Cognitive Science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):111-32.
Jerry A. Fodor & Zenon W. Pylyshyn (1981). How Direct is Visual Perception? Some Reflections on Gibson's 'Ecological Approach'. Cognition 9 (2):139-96.
Eric Mandelbaum (2013). Thinking is Believing. Inquiry 57 (1):55-96.
Similar books and articles
Leslie F. Stevenson (2002). Six Levels of Mentality. Philosophical Explorations 5 (2):105-124.
Sara Worley (1997). Belief and Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 10 (1):41-55.
Stefan Schubert & Erik J. Olsson (2012). On the Coherence of Higher-Order Beliefs. Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):112-135.
Hannes Leitgeb (2007). Beliefs in Conditionals Vs. Conditional Beliefs. Topoi 26 (1):115-132.
Andrew Cling (1991). The Empirical Virtues of Belief. Philosophical Psychology 4 (3):303-23.
Steven Horst (1995). Eliminativism and the Ambiguity of `Belief'. Synthese 104 (1):123-45.
Ken Warmbrōd (1989). Beliefs and Sentences in the Head. Synthese 79 (2):201 - 230.
Lynne Rudder Baker (1994). Attitudes as Nonentities. Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):175-203.
Matthew Haug (2011). Explaining the Placebo Effect: Aliefs, Beliefs, and Conditioning. Philosophical Psychology 24 (5):679-698.
Pat A. Manfredi (1993). Tacit Beliefs and Other Doxastic Attitudes. Philosophia 22 (1-2):95-117.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads155 ( #25,668 of 1,938,583 )
Recent downloads (6 months)20 ( #24,641 of 1,938,583 )
How can I increase my downloads?