Graduate studies at Western
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):151-178 (2013)
|Abstract||Intuitions play an important role in contemporary epistemology. Over the last decade, however, experimental philosophers have published a number of studies suggesting that epistemic intuitions may vary in ways that challenge the widespread reliance on intuitions in epistemology. In a recent paper, Jennifer Nagel offers a pair of arguments aimed at showing that epistemic intuitions do not, in fact, vary in problematic ways. One of these arguments relies on a number of claims defended by appeal to the psychological literature on intuitive judgment and on mental state attribution (also known as “theory of mind”, “mindreading” and “folk psychology”). I call this the "theoretical argument". The other argument relies on recent experimental work carried out by Nagel and her collaborators. It is my contention that in setting out her theoretical argument, Nagel offers an account of the relevant scientific literature that is, in crucial respects, flawed and misleading. My main goal in this paper is to rectify these errors and to make it clear that, once this is done, Nagel’s theoretical argument collapses. Since Nagel’s experimental work has not yet been published, and available details are very sketchy, I do not discuss this work in detail. However, in the final section of the paper I offer some critical observations about Nagel’s strategy for dealing with empirical data that does not support her view – both other people’s and her own.|
|Keywords||experimental philosophy epistemology mindreading theory of mind cultural variation Gettier cases Nagel intuition perceptual illusion|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Jennifer Nagel (2013). Defending the Evidential Value of Epistemic Intuitions: A Reply to Stich. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):179-199.
Jennifer Nagel (2012). Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):495-527.
Jennifer Nagel (2012). Mindreading in Gettier Cases and Skeptical Pressure Cases. In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press.
Kenneth Boyd & Jennifer Nagel (forthcoming). The Reliability of Epistemic Intuitions. In Edouard Machery (ed.), Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy. Routledge.
Jennifer Nagel (2007). Epistemic Intuitions. Philosophy Compass 2 (6):792–819.
Finn Spicer (2010). Cultural Variations in Folk Epistemic Intuitions. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (4):515-529.
Jennifer Nagel, Valerie San Juan & Raymond A. Mar (2013). Lay Denial of Knowledge for Justified True Beliefs. Cognition 129:652-661.
Carol Mason Spicer (1996). Introduction. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 6 (4):ix-x.
Renia Gasparatou (2010). Experimental Appeals to Intuition. Crítica 42 (124):31-50.
Frank Hofmann (2010). Intuitions, Concepts, and Imagination. Philosophical Psychology 23 (4):529-546.
Michael Devitt (2012). Whither Experimental Semantics? Theoria 27 (1):5-36.
James Genone (2012). Theories of Reference and Experimental Philosophy. Philosophy Compass 7 (2):152-163.
Jonathan M. Weinberg, Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich (2001). Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions. Philosophical Topics, 29 (1-2):429-460.
Matthew S. Bedke (2010). Intuitional Epistemology in Ethics. Philosophy Compass 5 (12):1069-1083.
Terence Rajivan Edward (2009). Nagel on Concievability. Abstracta 5 (1):16-29.
Added to index2011-08-30
Total downloads315 ( #524 of 739,318 )
Recent downloads (6 months)76 ( #453 of 739,318 )
How can I increase my downloads?