David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Renee Elio (ed.), Common Sense, Reasoning and Rationality. Oxford University Press. 236-268 (2002)
During the last 25 years, researchers studying human reasoning and judgment in what has become known as the “heuristics and biases” tradition have produced an impressive body of experimental work which many have seen as having “bleak implications” for the rationality of ordinary people (Nisbett and Borgida 1975). According to one proponent of this view, when we reason about probability we fall victim to “inevitable illusions” (Piattelli-Palmarini 1994). Other proponents maintain that the human mind is prone to “systematic deviations from rationality” (Bazerman & Neale 1986) and is “not built to work by the rules of probability” (Gould 1992). It has even been suggested that human beings are “a species that is uniformly probability-blind” (Piattelli-Palmarini 1994). This provocative and pessimistic interpretation of the experimental findings has been challenged from many different directions over the years. One of the most recent and energetic of these challenges has come from the newly emerging field of evolutionary psychology, where it has been argued that it’s singularly implausible to claim that our species would have evolved with no “instinct for probability” and, hence, be “blind to chance” (Pinker 1997, 351). Though evolutionary psychologists concede that it is possible to design experiments that “trick our probability..
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Eric Mandelbaum (2013). Thinking is Believing. Inquiry 57 (1):55-96.
Thomas Sturm (2012). The “Rationality Wars” in Psychology: Where They Are and Where They Could Go. Inquiry 55 (1):66-81.
Jennifer M. Morton (2011). Toward an Ecological Theory of the Norms of Practical Deliberation. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):561-584.
Andrea Polonioli (2012). Gigerenzer's 'External Validity Argument' Against the Heuristics and Biases Program: An Assessment. [REVIEW] Mind and Society 11 (2):133-148.
Peter H. Schwartz (2009). Disclosure and Rationality: Comparative Risk Information and Decision-Making About Prevention. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 30 (3):199-213.
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