Intentionality and naturalism

Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):159-82 (1994)
...the deepest motivation for intentional irrealism derives not from such relatively technical worries about individualism and holism as we
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References found in this work BETA
Lynne Rudder Baker (1987). Saving Belief. Princeton University Press.
Keith Donnellan (1983). Kripke and Putnam on Natural Kind Terms. In C. Ginet & S. Shoemaker (eds.), Knowledge and Mind. Oxford Univresity Press. 84-104.

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Citations of this work BETA
Stephen Laurence & Eric Margolis (2003). Concepts and Conceptual Analysis. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):253-282.
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