David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 47 (2):188-202 (1980)
This essay grows out of the conviction that recent work by psychologists studying human reasoning has important implications for a broad range of philosophical issues. To illustrate our thesis we focus on Nelson Goodman's elegant and influential attempt to "dissolve" the problem of induction. In the first section of the paper we sketch Goodman's account of what it is for a rule of inference to be justified. We then marshal empirical evidence indicating that, on Goodman's account of justification, patently invalid inferential rules turn out to be "justified." We conclude that something is seriously wrong with Goodman's story about justification. In the second section we attempt to patch Goodman's account. The notion of epistemic authority and the social aspect of justification play central roles in the alternative account of justification that we propose
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Citations of this work BETA
L. Jonathan Cohen (1981). Can Human Irrationality Be Experimentally Demonstrated? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):317-370.
Stephen Stich (1988). Reflective Equilibrium, Analytic Epistemology and the Problem of Cognitive Diversity. Synthese 74 (3):391-413.
Gilbert Harman & Sanjeev R. Kulkarni (2006). The Problem of Induction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):559-575.
Stephen P. Stich (1985). Could Man Be an Irrational Animal? Synthese 64 (1):115-35.
Alvin I. Goldman (1987). Foundations of Social Epistemics. Synthese 73 (1):109 - 144.
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