David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (1-2):11 - 24 (2005)
Speculation about the evolutionary origins of morality has yet to show how a biologically based capacity for morality might be connected to moral reasoning. Applying an evolutionary approach to three kinds of cases where partiality may or may not be morally reasonable, this paper explores a possible connection between a psychological capacity for morality and processes of wide reflective moral equilibrium. The central hypothesis is that while we might expect a capacity for morality to include aspects of partiality, we might also expect these same aspects of the capacity to produce systemic forms of performance-based error. Understanding these errors helps point the way toward a theory of moral competence that includes aspects of both partiality and impartiality.
|Keywords||evolutionary ethics evolutionary psychology impartiality moral emotions moral epistemology moral psychology partiality wide reflective equilibrium|
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References found in this work BETA
John Rawls (1971). A Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press.
Derek Parfit (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press.
Norman Daniels (1996). Justice and Justification: Reflective Equilibrium in Theory and Practice. Cambridge University Press.
Margaret Olivia Little (1995). Seeing and Caring: The Role of Affect in Feminist Moral Epistemology. Hypatia 10 (3):117 - 137.
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Citations of this work BETA
John Collier & Michael Stingl (2013). Evolutionary Moral Realism. Biological Theory 7 (3):218-226.
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