Some problems for proof-theoretic semantics

Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):278–298 (2008)
Proof-theoretic semantics is an approach to logical semantics based on two ideas, of which the first is that the meaning of a logical connective can be explained by stipulating that some mode of inference, e.g., a natural deduction introduction or elimination rule, is permissible. The second idea is that the soundness of rules which are not stipulated outright may be deduced by some proof-theoretic argument from properties of the rules which are stipulated outright. I examine the first idea. My main conclusion is that the idea is more problematic, and requires more discussion, than has been generally realized. I mention five problems which will have to be overcome before the idea can be accepted as definitely viable.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.506.x
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,667
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Timothy Williamson (1996). Knowing and Asserting. Philosophical Review 105 (4):489.
Stephen Read (2000). Harmony and Autonomy in Classical Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (2):123-154.

View all 7 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

50 ( #68,426 of 1,726,249 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

3 ( #231,316 of 1,726,249 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.