David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (1):73-86 (2011)
According to Rosalind Hursthouse’s virtue based account of right action, an act is right if it is what a fully virtuous person would do in that situation. Robert Johnson has criticized the account on the grounds that the actions a non-virtuous person should take are often uncharacteristic of the virtuous person, and thus Hursthouse’s account of right action is too narrow. The non-virtuous need to take steps to improve themselves morally, and the fully virtuous person need not take these steps. So Johnson argues that any virtue based account of right action will have to find a way to ground a moral obligation to improve oneself. This paper argues that there is an account of virtue that can offer a partial solution to Johnson’s challenge, an account where virtue is a type of practical skill and in which the virtuous person is seen as having expertise. The paper references the account of skill acquisition developed by Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus. Their research demonstrates that novices in a skill have to employ different strategies to act well than the strategies used by the experts, and so the ‘virtue as skill’ thesis provides support for Johnson’s claim that the actions of the non-virtuous will differ from the virtuous. On the other hand, their research suggests that there is no separating the commitment to improve yourself from the possession of expertise, and so the ‘virtue as skill’ thesis has the resources for grounding the obligation to improve oneself in an account of virtue
|Keywords||Dreyfus Ethics Expertise Hursthouse Johnson Right action Skill Virtue|
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References found in this work BETA
Aristotle (2012). Nicomachean Ethics. Courier Dover Publications.
Hubert Dreyfus (2000). Could Anything Be More Intelligible Than Everyday Intelligibility?: Reinterpreting Division I of Being and Time in the Light of Division II. In James E. Faulconer & Mark A. Wrathall (eds.), Appropriating Heidegger. Cambridge University Press. 155--174.
Hubert L. Dreyfus (2005). Overcoming the Myth of the Mental: How Philosophers Can Profit From the Phenomenology of Everyday Expertise. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 79 (2):47 - 65.
Hubert L. Dreyfus & Stuart E. Dreyfus (1991). Towards a Phenomenology of Ethical Expertise. Human Studies 14 (4):229 - 250.
Rosalind Hursthouse (1999/2001). On Virtue Ethics. Oxford University Press.
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