Acting and causing: On Pietroski's causing actions

The book is an extended argument against neuralism (or against a sort of argument for neuralism), where neuralism is understood to be the identification of mental events with neurophysiological events. So an event of a trying is not supposed to be inner in the sense that a brain event is. And although Pietroski accepts Descartes metaphysical distinction between mental events and physical events, he does not need to extend this to the thought that mental events occupy a special mental realm. So there seems to be no underlying theoretical motivation for denying the natural thought that tryings are usually ‘out there’ in..
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