British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (2):177-185 (1991)
|Abstract||Thomas Kuhn has argued that scientists never reject a paradigm without simultaneously accepting a new paradigm. Coupled with Kuhn's claim that it is paradigms as a whole, and not individual theories, that are accepted or rejected, this thesis is seen as one of Kuhn's main challenges to the rationality of science. I argue that Kuhn is mistaken in this claim; at least in some instances, science rejects a paradigm despite the absence of a successor. In particular, such a description best fits Kuhn's most discussed example, the Copernican Revolution. By differentiating scientific discoveries into three types, spontaneous, implicit, and directed, we see that Kuhn's thesis holds for spontaneous and implicit discoveries, but not directed discoveries. Directed discoveries must be understood by an alternative account of falsifiability, based on argument by reductio ad absurdum rather than argument by modus tollens as traditional accounts of falsifiability would have it|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Struan Jacobs & Brian Mooney (1997). Sociology as a Source of Anomaly in Thomas Kuhn's System of Science. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 27 (4):466-485.
K. Brad Wray (2007). Kuhnian Revolutions Revisited. Synthese 158 (1):61-73.
William H. Austin (1972). Paradigms, Rationality, and Partial Communication. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 3 (2):203-218.
Daniel Garber (2001). Descartes and the Scientific Revolution: Some Kuhnian Reflections. Perspectives on Science 9 (4):405-422.
Thomas Nickles (ed.) (2003). Thomas Kuhn. Cambridge University Press.
Paul Hoyningen-Huene (2008). Thomas Kuhn and the Chemical Revolution. Foundations of Chemistry 10 (2):101-115.
Daniel Sirtes & Eric Oberheim (2006). Einstein, Entropy, and Anomalies. AIP Conference Proceedings 861:1147-1154.
Panos Theodorou (2004). Of the Same in the Different. What is Wrong with Kuhn's Use of ``Seeing'' and ``Seeing As''. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 35 (1):175-200.
Paul Hoyningen-Huene (1993). Reconstructing Scientific Revolutions: Thomas S. Kuhn's Philosophy of Science. University of Chicago Press.
Gerald Doppelt (1980). Ii. A Reply to Siegel on Kuhnian Relativism. Inquiry 23 (1):117 – 123.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads14 ( #90,504 of 722,839 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,917 of 722,839 )
How can I increase my downloads?