Contextualism and warranted assertion

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):92–113 (2007)
Contextualists offer "high-low standards" practical cases to show that a variety of knowledge standards are in play in different ordinary contexts. These cases show nothing of the sort, I maintain. However Keith DeRose gives an ingenious argument that standards for knowledge do go up in high-stakes cases. According to the knowledge account of assertion (Kn), only knowledge warrants assertion. Kn combined with the context sensitivity of assertability yields contextualism about knowledge. But is Kn correct? I offer a rival account of warranted assertion and argue that it beats Kn as a response to the "knowledge" version of Moore's Paradox.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2007.00282.x
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References found in this work BETA
Keith DeRose (1995). Solving the Skeptical Problem. Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.
David Lewis (1996). Elusive Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Keith DeRose (2002). Assertion, Knowledge, and Context. Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.

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Citations of this work BETA
Peter Pagin (2015). Problems with Norms of Assertion. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):n/a-n/a.
David Sosa (2009). Dubious Assertions. Philosophical Studies 146 (2):269 - 272.

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