Contextualism and warranted assertion

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):92–113 (2007)
Abstract
Contextualists offer "high-low standards" practical cases to show that a variety of knowledge standards are in play in different ordinary contexts. These cases show nothing of the sort, I maintain. However Keith DeRose gives an ingenious argument that standards for knowledge do go up in high-stakes cases. According to the knowledge account of assertion (Kn), only knowledge warrants assertion. Kn combined with the context sensitivity of assertability yields contextualism about knowledge. But is Kn correct? I offer a rival account of warranted assertion and argue that it beats Kn as a response to the "knowledge" version of Moore's Paradox.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2007.00282.x
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive Jim Stone, Contextualism and warranted assertion
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1996). Elusive Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Keith DeRose (1995). Solving the Skeptical Problem. Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.
Keith DeRose (2002). Assertion, Knowledge, and Context. Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.

View all 11 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
David Sosa (2009). Dubious Assertions. Philosophical Studies 146 (2):269 - 272.
Peter Pagin (2015). Problems with Norms of Assertion. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1).

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

248 ( #11,779 of 1,932,483 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

6 ( #149,261 of 1,932,483 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.