Domain-sensitivity

Synthese 184 (2):137-155 (2012)
Abstract
In this paper, I argue that there are good motivations for a relativist account of the domain-sensitivity of quantifier phrases. I will frame the problem as a puzzle involving what looks like a logically valid inference, yet one whose premises are true while the conclusion is false. After discussing some existing accounts, literalist and contextualist, I will present and argue for an account that may be said to be relativist in the following sense: (i) a domain of quantification is required for determining truth value, but is idle in determining semantic content, and (ii) the same sentence, as used on one and the same occasion, may receive different truth values relative to different domains
Keywords philpapers: relativism about truth
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-010-9729-z
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References found in this work BETA
Stefano Predelli & Isidora Stojanovic (2008). Semantic Relativism and the Logic of Indexicals. In Manuel García-Carpintero & Max Kölbel (eds.), Relative Truth. Oxford University Press 63--90.
John MacFarlane (2005). Making Sense of Relative Truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):321–339.
John MacFarlane (2003). Future Contingents and Relative Truth. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):321–336.
Jason Stanley (2000). Context and Logical Form. Linguistics and Philosophy 23 (4):391--434.

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