Delusions and brain injury: The philosophy and psychology of belief

Mind and Language 12 (3-4):327-64 (1997)
Circumscribed delusional beliefs can follow brain injury. We suggest that these involve anomalous perceptual experiences created by a deficit to the person's perceptual system, and misinterpretation of these experiences due to biased reasoning. We use the Capgras delusion (the claim that one or more of one's close relatives has been replaced by an exact replica or impostor) to illustrate this argument. Our account maintains that people voicing this delusion suffer an impairment that leads to faces being perceived as drained of their normal affective significance, and an additional reasoning bias that leads them to put greater weight on forming beliefs that are observationally adequate rather than beliefs that are a conservative extension of their existing stock. We show how this position can integrate issues involved in the philosophy and psychology of belief, and examine the scope for mutually beneficial interaction.
Keywords Belief  Brain  Delusion  Injury  Language  Metaphysics
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DOI 10.1111/1468-0017.00051
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Ryan Mckay (2012). Delusional Inference. Mind and Language 27 (3):330-355.

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Mark Sherer (2005). Rehabilitation of Impaired Awareness. In Walter M. Jr. High, Angelle M. Sander, Margaret A. Struchen & Karen A. Hart (eds.), Rehabilitation for Traumatic Brain Injury. Oxford University Press 31-46.
Robert Klee (2004). Why Some Delusions Are Necessarily Inexplicable Beliefs. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1):25-34.

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