David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Mind and Language 12 (3-4):327-64 (1997)
Circumscribed delusional beliefs can follow brain injury. We suggest that these involve anomalous perceptual experiences created by a deficit to the person's perceptual system, and misinterpretation of these experiences due to biased reasoning. We use the Capgras delusion (the claim that one or more of one's close relatives has been replaced by an exact replica or impostor) to illustrate this argument. Our account maintains that people voicing this delusion suffer an impairment that leads to faces being perceived as drained of their normal affective significance, and an additional reasoning bias that leads them to put greater weight on forming beliefs that are observationally adequate rather than beliefs that are a conservative extension of their existing stock. We show how this position can integrate issues involved in the philosophy and psychology of belief, and examine the scope for mutually beneficial interaction.
|Keywords||Belief Brain Delusion Injury Language Metaphysics|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome (2009). A Role for Ownership and Authorship in the Analysis of Thought Insertion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2):205-224.
Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome (2008). Delusional Beliefs and Reason Giving. Philosophical Psychology 21 (6):801-21.
Matthew Ratcliffe (2008). The Phenomenological Role of Affect in the Capgras Delusion. Continental Philosophy Review 41 (2):195-216.
Michael Cholbi (2006). Moral Belief Attribution: A Reply to Roskies. Philosophical Psychology 19 (5):629 – 638.
Garry Young (2011). Beliefs, Experiences and Misplaced Being: An Interactionist Account of Delusional Misidentification. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (2):195-215.
Similar books and articles
Mark Sherer (2005). Rehabilitation of Impaired Awareness. In Walter M. Jr. High, Angelle M. Sander, Margaret A. Struchen & Karen A. Hart (eds.), Rehabilitation for Traumatic Brain Injury. Oxford University Press. 31-46.
Walter M. High, Angelle M. Sander, Margaret A. Struchen & Karen A. Hart (eds.) (2005). Rehabilitation for Traumatic Brain Injury. Oxford University Press.
Robert Klee (2004). Why Some Delusions Are Necessarily Inexplicable Beliefs. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1):25-34.
George P. Prigatano & Daniel L. Schacter (eds.) (1991). Awareness of Deficits After Brain Injury. Oxford University Press.
Laura J. Bach & Anthony S. David (2006). Self-Awareness After Acquired and Traumatic Brain Injury. Neuropsychological Rehabilitation 16 (4):397-414.
E. V. Sharova (2005). Electrographic Correlates of Brain Reactions to Afferent Stimuli in Postcomatose Unconscious States After Severe Brain Injury. Human Physiology 31 (3):245-254.
Jack K. Plummer (1995). Ethical Considerations in Brain Injury Rehabilitation: Applications to Mild Traumatic Brain Injury. [REVIEW] HEC Forum 7 (2-3):166-182.
Mark Sherer, Tessa Hart & Todd G. Nick (2003). Measurement of Impaired Self-Awareness After Traumatic Brain Injury: A Comparison of the Patient Competency Rating Scale and the Awareness Questionnaire. Brain Injury 17 (1):25-37.
Tim Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie (2004). Bottom-Up or Top-Down: Campbell's Rationalist Account of Monothematic Delusions. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1):1-11.
Diane Dirette (2002). The Development of Awareness and the Use of Compensatory Strategies for Cognitive Deficits. Brain Injury 16 (10):861-871.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads74 ( #20,740 of 1,102,106 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #52,509 of 1,102,106 )
How can I increase my downloads?